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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
Case No. 20060473-CA 
MILTON SMITH, : 20060474-ca 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Defendant is appealing from a Judgment, Sentence and Commitment in the Second 
District Court for Weber County, Utah, dated April 11, 2006. The Defendant pled guilty to 
Distributing a Controlled Substance, a second degree felony, and Attempted Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to serve a term of one to 
fifteen years at the Utah State Prison and three hundred and sixty-five days. The sentences 
were ordered to run consecutive. Jurisdiction for the Appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT 
DIDN'T HOLD THE STATE TO THE PLEA AGREEMENT 
AND THEN SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT TO PRISON? 
Standard of Review: The Court must determine whether the trial court abused 
its discretion when it allowed the State to breach its agreement and then 
sentenced the Defendant to prison. "A sentence will not be overturned on 
appeal unless the trial court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all 
legally relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally prescribed 
limits." Stale v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). This issue 
was preserved when the Defendant's attorney objected to the State's failure to 
remain silent. (R. 55/5, 8). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Section 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except 
the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School 
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive 
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged in District Court, case number 051905438, 
with Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a first degree felony. (R. 001) This 
offense occurred on September 12, 2005. (R. 001). On December 28, 2005, 
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Defendant pled guilty to Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a second degree 
felony. (R. 52/3) As part of the plea agreement the State agreed to remain silent 
at sentencing. (R. 52/3) Defendant was scheduled to be sentenced on February 
8, 2006. However, prior to sentencing Defendant was charged with an unrelated 
third degree felony for Possession of a Controlled Substance in District Court, 
case number 061900536. (R. 001) This offense occurred on August 11, 2005, 
which was prior to the date of offense on the distribution charge. (R. 001). 
On February 22, 2006, Defendant pled guilty to a class A misdemeanor 
attempted possession of a controlled substance. (R. 54/3-6). There were no 
deals made concerning sentencing on the class A misdemeanor. (R. 54/3). The 
Defendant was sentenced on April 5, 2006. At sentencing the prosecutor asked 
for the second (the class A misdemeanor) case to run consecutive to the 
distribution charge. During her argument she referenced both cases and the 
Defendant's activities regarding both cases several times. (R. 55/7-8). The 
Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison 
and three hundred sixty-five days to run consecutive. (R. 36-37 case number 
051905438, and R. 17-18 case # 061900536). The final order was signed on 
both cases April 11, 2006. A notice of appeal was filed on May 11, 2006. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant pled guilty to a second degree felony charge of 
Distributing a Controlled Substance on December 28, 2005. (R. 52/3-6). The 
Defendant allegedly sold cocaine to an undercover police officer. (R. 52/4). As 
part of the plea bargain, the State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. (R. 
52/3) After the Defendant pled guilty but before he was sentenced he was 
charged with a third degree felony, Possession of a Controlled Substance that 
occurred prior to the distribution charge. On February 22, 2006, Defendant pled 
guilty to a reduced charge of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a 
class A misdemeanor. (R. 54/3-6) There were no agreements made concerning 
sentencing. The Defendant was sentenced on April 5, 2006. During the 
sentencing hearing the prosecutor made several references to both of 
Defendant's cases. The trial judge sentenced the Defendant to one to fifteen 
years and three hundred sixty-five days to the prison to be served consecutively. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Defendant entered into a plea agreement on a second degree felony 
wherein the State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. The Defendant also pled 
guilty to a separate unrelated case of Attempted Possession of a Controlled 
Substance, a class A misdemeanor. There were no agreements concerning 
sentencing. Therefore, the State was allowed to speak concerning the class A 
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misdemeanor and at the most ask for one year in jail Instead, the State made 
several references to both charges as well as to drug dealing and drug slinging. 
The trial judge then sentenced the Defendant to prison and ordered the 
misdemeanor to run consecutive to the prison sentence. The Defendant appeals, 
requesting this Court to remand the matter back to the trial court to determine 
the appropriate remedy for the State's breach. 
ARGUMENT 
In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the Supreme Court 
recognized that a defendant who enters into a plea bargain with the State has a 
constitutional right to a remedy when that plea agreement is broken. Id. at 262. 
The Court left the question of whether that remedy should be withdrawal of the 
guilty plea or specific performance of the plea agreement to the state courts to 
decide. Id. at 263. 
In Utah, there is no bright line rule as to what the proper remedy is. See, 
State v. Smit, 95 P.3d 1203 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). "hi dicta, the Utah Supreme 
Court in State v. Garfield, 552 P.2d 129 (Utah 1976), seems to leave discretion 
in the hands of the trial judge as to the appropriate remedy for breach of a plea 
agreement." Id. at 1206. 
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In the case at bar, the State's attorney entered into an agreement with the 
Defendant through his attorney. The Defendant relied on the State's 
representations that they would remain silent concerning his felony charge. 
Instead, the State repeatedly breached the agreement by referring to the 
distribution case and the circumstances surrounding it. 
The State began by asking that the charges run consecutive to each other. 
(R. 55/5). After defense counsel pointed out that the State had agreed to remain 
silent, the prosecutor said, "I don't think we agreed to remain silent on either 
one of them." (Id.) After she reviewed the plea affidavit, she acknowledged 
that the State had agreed to remain silent on the felony but not the misdemeanor. 
(R. 55/6-7) She stated, "If we did not agree to remain silent on the misdemeanor 
then I'm going to speak to the misdemeanor case." (R. 55/7). 
The prosecutor's next words were, "I think the problem in these two cases 
and what would justify running theses two charges consecutively, is that both 
of these incidents are happening . . . over on Adams Avenue." (R. 
55/7)(emphasis added). She went on to state that "that area is just full of 
individuals who are dealing drugs, using drugs, and slinging drugs in that area. . 
. . And what this defendant has apparently done on two different occasions, has 
been part of the problem . . ." (Id. )(emphasis added). She later added "[t]his 
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isn't just about use this is about blighting a whole area of this city on a regular 
basis." (Id. at 7-8)(emphasis added). 
Defendant's attorney interjected. He stated, CT guess the real problem I 
have is the State made an agreement to remain silent on sentencing on the more 
serious charge, and the State just made in their recommendation references three 
times to two cases, and I just think that violates the whole due process issue 
here. And I just think the Court just needs not to take that into consideration." 
(Id at 8.) 
The trial judge didn't respond to defense counsel's objections. The 
prosecutor started speaking again and said, 4Tf defense counsel thinks we are to 
remain silent on the felony but then the misdemeanor gets resolved second in the 
scenario with a specific agreement that Mr. Daines is going to be recommending 
consecutive, it doesn't bind us on that second case from addressing it. Anything 
I'm saying has specifically to do with whether or not the misdemeanor ought to 
run consecutive to the felony. I have made no comment in regard to the felony. 
The problem is that what justifies the consecutive sentence, is because the 
defendant has become involved in that particular felony case." (Id. at 8-9.) 
There are a couple of obvious problems with the State's justification for 
breaching the plea agreement. For starters, in the second case the State hadn't 
made a "specific agreement" that it would be recommending a consecutive 
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sentence. See, (R. 54/3-7.) The same prosecutor was present at both the entry 
of the plea on the misdemeanor case and at sentencing. At no time was there a 
reference that the State would be seeking consecutive sentences. The only 
reference to the plea agreement was made by Defendant's counsel who stated, 
"[t]he State has agreed to amend the charge to an attempted possession of pills 
without prescription, a Class A misdemeanor. The State agreed to reduce it to a 
Class A and that's the extent of the negotiations." (R. 54/3). 
Since the State was allowed to speak concerning sentencing the State was 
allowed to reference a class A misdemeanor, Attempted Possession of a 
Controlled Substance. Instead, the prosecutor referenced the two cases four 
times. She also referenced drug dealing and "slinging drugs." She made the 
specific statement that "[t]his isn't just about use, this is about blighting a whole 
area of this city on a regular basis" (Id. at 7-8)(emphasis added). She was 
clearly not referring to a simple possession charge that had been amended to a 
class A misdemeanor. Notwithstanding defense counsel's best efforts to object, 
he was ignored by the trial court and his objections were basically ignored. 
In Stale v. Smit, this Court stated that, "[w]e conclude that when a plea 
agreement is breached by the prosecutor, the proper remedy is either specific 
performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea both at the 
discretion of the trial judge." Id. at 1207. 
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This case should therefore be remanded to the trial court for a 
determination of the appropriate remedy. "[I]f the prosecutor in the instant case 
had breached the plea agreement, we would remand to the trial court for a 
determination of the appropriate remedy." Id. at 1207. 
If it is determined that specific performance is the appropriate remedy, the 
Defendant would request that he be resentenced by a different judge. "We note 
that if the trial court determines that specific performance of the plea agreement 
is the proper remedy for the State's breach, the State's recommendation and 
Defendant's resentencing should take place before a different judge/5 State v. 
Hale, 2005 WL 1530526 (Utah App.), 2005 UT App 305, fn. 4. 
CONCLUSION 
The State breached its agreement to remain silent when the prosecutor 
referred on multiple occasions to both of Defendant's charges as well as drug 
dealing and drug slinging. Therefore, the Defendant respectfully requests this 
Court to remand the matter to the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy 
for the State's breach. 
DATED this j ^day of September 2006. 
DEE W. SMITH 
Attorney for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MILTON SMITH, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051905438 FS ,~7r 
Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Date: April 5, 2006 
^Utj 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vennaw 
Prosecutor: BEATON, BRENDA J 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): STATE PDA, GARY BARR 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 14, 1950 
Video 
Tape Number: J040506 Tape Count: 3:45 
CHARGES 
1. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO DIST C/S (amended) - 2nd Degree 
Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/29/2005 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and 
represented by Gary Barr, public defender. Brenda Beaton is 
present representing the State of Utah. Attorney Barr addresses 
the Court. The State agreed to remain silent at sentencing. 
The Court proceeds with sentencing. 
P^HP 1 
Case No: 051905438 
Date: Apr 05, 2006 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE TO 
PTST C./S a 2nd Degree Felony,, the defendant is sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen 
years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence in this case shall run consecutively with the sentence 
imposed in case number 061900536. Credit for all time served is 
granted. 
Dated this / ( day of tAf/<S/ , _20_< 
- • " > 
if^-
,-ERNIE W JONES 
District Court Jud6e 
Paap 2 (last) 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
MILTON SMITH, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 061900536 FS nr$ 1 
Judge: ERNIE W JONES 
Date: April 5, 2 006 
^(Jb 
Clerk: vennaw 
Prosecutor: BEATON, BRENDA J 
Defendant's Attorney (s) : STATE PDA, GARY BARR 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: April 14, 1950 
Video 
Tape Number: J040506 Tape Count: 3:45 
CHARGES 
1. ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A CONT SUB. W/O CONTAINER (amended) -
Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/22/2006 Guilty 
HEARING 
This is the time set for sentencing. The defendant is present and 
represented by Gary Barr, public defender. Brenda Beaton is 
present representing the State of Utah. Attorney Barr addresses 
the Court. Attorney Beaton addresses the Court. 
Sentencing proceeds. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED POSSESSION OF A 
CONT SUB. W/O CONTAINER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) 
Paae 1 
Case No: 061900536 
Date: Apr 05, 2006 
SENTENCE JAIL CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The sentence in this case may be served at the Utah State Prison, 
and shall run consecutively with the sentence imposed in case 
number 051905438. The defendant is granted credit for time 
previously served. 
Dated this ; ( day of - (Ave/ ( 20 ^  C . 
ERNIE W JONES 
District Court JiAdge 
Pace ? (laqf) 
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Page 3 
1 OGDEN, UTAH, WEDNESDAY, APRIL 5, 2006, 3:45 PM 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: The State of Utah versus Milton 
4 Smith, Case No. 5438 and 0536 on for sentencing. 
5 Did you get a copy of the pre-sentence 
6 reports on Mr. Smith? 
7 I MR. BARR: Yes, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Is there any legal reason we 
9 shouldn't impose sentence? 
10 MR. BARR: No, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: Is there anything you want to say 
12 about the recommendation? 
13 MR. BARR: Well, he didn't get a good 
14 recommendation and I know he doesn't have a very good 
15 history. But if we kind of look at it, it looks like 
16 back in California in the early '90s he was on parole 
17 for something and I'm trying to go back and I'm trying 
18 to figure out what the charge was that he was on parole 
19 for. And it's kind of hard to figure out because most 
2 0 of the things that are on there sound like misdemeanor 
21 type offenses and, granted, he's had a lot of them. I 
22 guess maybe it was an armed robbery back in 1972, that's 
2 3 obviously it, and maybe he had-- I don't know. Maybe 
24 it's a life sentence out there, I don't know. But then 
25 he had, you know, he had various violations after that 
but 
has 
most 
had, 
of them 
since he 
since 1996 he has 
the drug 
problem < 
time and 
ask: Lng i 
issues. 
and he's • 
he would 
look 
has 
had 
And 
like i mis ,demeanors. And 
been here in 
two 
Utah he has 
Class B misdemeanors 
he admit 
probably 
like to 
f the Court would 
had 
get 
.s to me that he 
a drug problem f 
help 
consider 
And he is 
something o 
F 
then 
had-
and 
>age 4 
he 
-
now 
has a drug 
or a 
just 
ther 
long 
than 
sending him to prison. He would like to be in a drug 
treatment program. He tells me his fiance is here in 
Court, they plan to be married on May the 9th, and he 
would like to be able to have a life with her. And he 
has a three-year old son. But he admits he has a drug 
problem and he is just asking if the Court would give 
him a zero tolerance type of a probation with a 
treatment program. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Smith, anything 
you wanted to say? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. I know I 
have a problem. State prison would probably do me good. 
But what I really need is some help, you know, with my 
drug problems. I know I have been here since October. 
I assume, you know, I'm not going to come here-- I've 
had chance after chance, but all I'm asking, is for one 
chance, Your Honor, you know, to prove to you I can get 
off of this with a little help. That's all I want, Your 
Page 
1 Honor, is just one chance. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Does the State want 
3 to be heard? 
4 MS. BEATON: Mr. Daines thinks that Case No. 
5 53 6 ought to run consecutive. 
6 MR. BARR: Your Honor, I have a note in my 
7 I file that says the State would agree to remain silent. 
8 MS. BEATON: Mine clearly says with no dea] 
9 about sentencing. He has pleaded to a more serious 
10 charge. This should be consecutive to that. 
11 MR. BARR: And that might be on the Class A 
12 that he said that but he did say but--
13 MS. BEATON: That's what I'm talking about. 
14 I And he-- I don't have a note--
15 THE COURT: He probably agreed to remain 
16 I silent on the Class A. 
17 MS. BEATON: I don't think we have. 
18 MR. BARR: My notes--
19 MS. BEATON: I don't think we agreed to 
2 0 remain silent on either one of them. 
21 MR. BARR: Do you have a copy? Can we look 
22 at the plea agreement. 
2 3 MS. BEATON: Okay. It does say that on the 
24 (inaudible). 
2 5 MR. BARR: On the misdemeanor? 
Page 6 
1 MS. BEATON: (Inaudible). 
2 MR. BARR: On the Class A case, I didn't 
3 negotiate that one, so I don't know what the deal was 
4 between Mr. Allen and Mr. Daines. 
5 THE COURT: On the 2nd, do you want to see it? 
6 It says State to remain silent at sentencing. 
7 I MS. BEATON: But the Class A doesn't say that. 
8 I THE COURT: The Class A doesn't say? was it 
9 the same day? 
10 MS. BEATON: No, there's n o -
il MR. BARR: That was a subsequent date. 
12 MS. BEATON: (inaudible) different time. 
13 MR. BARR: That was a subsequent date. 
14 THE COURT: So maybe you agreed to remain 
15 silent on the--
16 MS. BEATON: The felony. 
17 THE COURT: --felony and not on the Class A; 
18 is that--
19 MS. BEATON: That's all it says. 
20 THE COURT: Yeah, you're welcome to look at 
21 the file if you would like, but I don't--
22 MR. BARR: And for whatever reason that Class 
23 A, does appear to have occurred before the more serious 
24 offense. 
2 5 MS. BEATON: Well, I'm just telling you what 
Page 7 
Mr. Daines is saying is that if we did not agree to 
remain silent on the misdemeanor then I'm going to speak 
to the misdemeanor case. 
THE COURT: It looks to me like he agreed to 
remain silent on the felony but there isn't anything in 
the file on the Class A so--
MS. BEATON: I think the problem in these two 
cases and what would justify running these two charges 
consecutively, is that both of these incidents are 
happening, I don't know if the Court picked this up, but 
they both happened over on Adams Avenue. And the 
problem, obviously, that this community is having is 
that area is just full of individuals who are dealing 
drugs, using drugs, and slinging drugs in that area. So 
the officers have really been hassled, the Strike Force 
and the officers of the Police Department, in trying to 
clean this neighborhood up. And what this defendant has 
apparently done on two different occasions, has been 
part of the problem, not part of the solution in that 
neighborhood. And so when the officers keep making 
arrests in this area for similar types of narcotic type 
activity going on, obviously, the defendant is not 
getting the picture as to what he needs to do in order 
to get off the drugs or to start being involved in this 
kind of activity. This isn't just about use this is 
Page 8 
about blighting a whole area of this city on a regular 
basis. And the police officers are there are on a 
routine basis making arrests. And this is about this 
defendant not taking need by being arrested the first 
time and becoming involved in this type of activity the 
second time. We think the charges ought to run 
consecutively. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else? 
MR. BARR: Well, I guess the real problem I 
have is the State made an agreement to remain silent on 
sentencing on the more serious charge, and the State 
just made in their recommendation references three times 
to two cases, and I just think that violates the whole 
due process issue here. And I just think the Court just 
needs not to take that into consideration. 
The other thing that they seem to forget is 
the misdemeanor case happened before the more serious 
one, so it's not like he did the more serious one and 
then went out and did the misdemeanor. 
MS. BEATON: I think the problem is just from 
a negotiation standpoint, if defense counsel thinks we 
are to remain silent on the felony but then the 
misdemeanor gets resolved second in the scenario with a 
specific agreement that Mr. Daines is going to be 
recommending consecutive, it doesn't bind us on that 
Page 9 
second case from addressing it. Anything I'm saying has 
specifically to do with whether or not the misdemeanor 
ought to run consecutive to the felony. I have made no 
comment in regard to the felony. The problem is that 
what justifies the consecutive sentence, is because the 
defendant has become involved in that particular felony 
case. But as far as the State is concerned, it PDA 
doesn't look into the issue before they work out a deal, 
we're not bound on the second case to keep our mouth 
shut. 
MR. BARR: I also think the presumption in 
the law when you're looking at consecutive versus 
concurrent is with something that happens subsequently 
and this didn't happen subsequently. 
THE COURT: All right. I guess the thing 
that jumps out at me, Mr. Smith, I haven't seen a rap 
sheet like this in a long time. It starts in 1968, it 
has gone on for for 3 7 years. According to the notes 
here you've gone to prison in '75, '89, '93, '95, '96. 
They put you on parole a couple of times and you ran 
away, so I don't know how I could put you on probation 
again with that kind of a track record. 
THE DEFENDANT: For ten years, Your Honor, 
you know, since 1996 to 2006 I didn't do any drugs. 
THE COURT: That's true. But you're back at 
it again in a b 
All 
ig way, out 
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there selling drugs so--
right. In the case ending in 5438, the 
distribution, arranging to 
substance, 
distribute a controlled 
a 2nd degree felony, the sentence is one to 
1 15 years at the 
ending in 
1 substance, 
Prison. I 
Commitment 
0536, 
the 
Utah State Prison. On the 2006 case 
the attempted possession of a controlled 
sentence is one year at the Utah State 
'11 recommend those sentences run consecutive. 
will 
for any time he 
you would 
get marrie 
MR. 
stay 
d. 
THE 
THE 
be forthwil 
has served 
BARR: Your 
ih. I will give him credit 
Good luck to you. 
Honor, he wants me to ask if 
the execution of the sentence so he can 
DEFENDANT: 
COURT: No. 
To May 9th? 
I'm not going to do that. 
That's too far out. That's almost a month and a half. 
That's six weeks. All right. Good luck to you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor, 
[Proceedings concluded at 3:55 p.m.] 
